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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
While the content requirements of CPLR 6511(b) were met,176 if a
notice of pendency fails to completely conform to that section, but does
give such information as to put a potential purchaser or encumbrancer
on inquiry notice concerning the items omitted, a court, utilizing the
rationale of the Third Department, should find the notice sufficient.
CPLR 7102: Court upholds constitutionality of replevin provision.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,177 the Supreme Court de-
dared unconstitutional a Wisconsin statutO78 which authorized wage
garnishment without first affording the debtor an opportunity for a
hearing.179 Reasoning that wages are a "specialized type of property,"'u 0
the Court held that prejudgment garnishment violated the due process
clause. Recently, in Lawson v. Mantell,'81 New York's replevin provi-
sion - CPLR 7102 -was attacked on the grounds that it denied due
process and equal protection of the laws.
In holding that CPLR 7102 was not violative of due process, the
Lawson court cited the essential safeguards contained in article 71:
(1) an action to recover the chattel must be commenced, and defendant
must be served personally; 8 2 (2) the replevied chattel is not imme-
diately awarded to the plaintiff; 18 3 and, (3) the defendant may challenge
the adequacy of plaintiff's surety, or move to impound the chattel
during the pendency of the action.8 4
Under the guidelines set by the Supreme Court in Sniadach, this
phase of Lawson is justified. For, the New York statute provides sub-
stantial opportunity for a hearing, and it should be emphasized that
the Wisconsin statute dealt with wages: a special kind of property
which requires stricter vigilance.
The plaintiff in Lawson also asserted that compelling an under-
taking by a poor person in order to secure the return of the chattel 8 5
176 CPLR 6511(b) requires that the notice of pendency contain:
(a) the names of the parties to the action;
(b) the object of the action; and
(c) a description of the property affected.
177 395 U.S. 337 (1969), rev'g 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
178 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 267.07(1) (1963).
179 The statute provided for wage garnishment merely by service on the debtor's em-
ployer and notice to the debtor within ten days thereafter. Id.
180 "A prejudgment wage garnishment.., is a taking which may impose tremendous
hardship on wage earners and their families." 395 U.S. at 340. See also Comment, Wage
Garnishment as a Collector's Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rav. 759, 767.
18162 Misc. 2d 307, 806 N.YS.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1969).
182 CPLR 7102(a) & (b).
183 Under CPLR 7102(f) the chattel is held for a period of three days, during which
time the defendant has an opportunity to reclaim it.
184 CPLR 7102(f); CPLR 7103(a) & (b).
185 CPLR 7103(a).
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violated the equal protection clause. The court, however, rejected this
argument by maintaining that in civil matters, the "[state] is not re-
quired... to give to some whatever others can afford."'1 6 And, the
court added that it found nothing "unequal in a statute that requires
one party to do nothing more than the other."'' s7
Article 71 does afford a party whose chattel has been replevied a
number of alternatives."' Nevertheless, the only viable method of re-
gaining the chattel is through the process of reclaiming,8 9 which
requires an undertaking identical to that originally executed.190 Those
that are not poor can afford to execute an undertaking and do without
some money for a while; the poor haven't the money to invest thusly.
Indeed, similar considerations have recently motivated one court to
allow a motion to vacate the replevin even though such a motion is
not authorized by the CPLR.'9'
Inasmuch as the requirement that the defendant execute an un-
dertaking is an obligation that is imposed by the state, a strong argu-
ment can be advanced that the section violates the equal protection
clause.192 Yet, civil cases dealing with discrimination between rich
and poor have primarily focused on statutes which denied the in-
digent access to the courts and ultimately affected a determination
of his rights.193 In contrast, CPLR 7102 does not preclude a hearing if
the defendant is unable to produce an undertaking; it merely regulates
the possession of the chattel during the pendency of the action.104
Hence, until more progress in the equal protection area is made,
CPLR 7102 should continue to withstand constitutional attack.
186 62 Misc. 2d at 309, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 320, citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
360 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
187 62 Misc. 2d at 309, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
188 CPLR 7102(f) (exception to sureties); CPLR 7103(a) (reclamation); CPLR 7103(b)
(motion to impound).
189 CPLR 7103(a). The exception to plaintiff's sureties merely forces the plaintiff to
prove its adequacy. If the plaintiff is successful, the action proceeds as before. 7A WK&M
7102.01. If the surety is inadequate, the chattel is returned but the plaintiff may
order another replevin, this time with a more substantial undertaking.
The motion to impound requires a $250 undertaking, is grantable only if the chattel
is of a special nature, and does not provide for return of the chattel during the pendency
of the action. CPLR 7103(b). See 7A WK&M 7102.24.
190 CPLR 7103(a). And, the surety must be at least twice the value of the chattel.
CPLR 7102(e).
191 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Austin, 60 Misc. 2d 908, 304 N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County 1969). But see Tamburro v. Trama, 59 Misc. 2d 488, 299 N.Y.S.2d 528 (West-
chester County Ct. 1969).
192 Cf. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.. 663 (1966).
193 See, e.g., Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1968).
194 See Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 CoLutr. L. Ray. 942, 964 (1970).
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